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"LAW-THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERTY" 
ABA Comment on the Theme of Law Day 1981 
Clarence Earl Gideon sat in a Florida prison for 
years, pleading his innocence and asserting his right to 
the legal counsel which had been denied him. Gideon's 
successful petition to the United States Supreme 
Court won a retrial and freedom for him and expand- 
ed the legal rights of all of us. The dramatic story of 
how one poor and uneducated man proved once again 
that ours is a government of laws, not men, was told 
in book form and on network television in Gideon's 
Trumpet. 
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Contrast the freely disseminated Gideon's Trumpet 
with another best-seller, The Gulag Archipelago, the 
story of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's many tormented 
years in the Russian penal system. This book had to 
be smuggled out piecemeal for publication in the Free 
World. For Solzhenitsyn, there was no appeal to law, 
but only to men who had the unrestricted power to 
free him or not, at their own whim. 
For Gideon, law was the language of liberty. 
For Solzhenitsyn, law was the language of tyranny. 
I As there was with Gideon, there is injustice in the 
American justice system. But our system has built in- 
to it a variety of self-correcting mechanisms so that 
the errors of the last generation will not be visited 
upon the next. 
i For well over a billion people on planet Earth, the 
only correcting mechanism for injustice in their sys- 
tems is  revolution or flight. The judicial systems of 
too many nations simply do not permit peaceful cor- 
rection since they are systems fundamentally of men, 
not law, and the men must be changed before prog- 
ress can be made. 
To remind Americans that our law is  the basis of 
individual rights, the ABA Standing Committee on 
Association Communications has chosen "Law-the 
Language of Liberty" for the 1981 Law Day theme. 
Our joint efforts are intended to restate the fact that 
the peaceful transfer of governmental power, the right 
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the right 
to freedom of speech and worship . . . all these and 
more are guaranteed us by law. And that these famil- 
iar phrases are our metaphors for liberty. 
But liberty is a dynamic, not a static, concept. It 
has been developing, growing and expanding for more 
than seven and one-half centuries-since 1215, when 
English nobles first won a measure of liberty and 
equality by forcing King John to sign the Magna Carta. 
By July 4, 1776, the idea of liberty had so devel- 
oped that the 13 United States could proudly declare: 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pur- 
suit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriv- 
ing their just powers from the consent of the 
governed . . ." 
This development has not ceased. Our concept of 
liberty under law has continued to grow, to expand, 
and to reach out and gather more and more people 
within i t s  protective shield. 
continued on page 3 
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Without freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, 
freedom of religion, freedom of the press, equal pro- 
tection of the laws, and other inalienable rights, men 
could not govern themselves intelligently. 
Liberty is  hard to acquire or retain, but easy to lose. 
It certainly is not free. Our liberty was won for us by 
the untiring efforts of men and women past numbering. 
As the preamble to our Constitution states, the 
most solemn obligation resting upon us is  to preserve 
freedom for ourselves and our children and our child- 
ren's children. 
The central message of Law Day '81 is that a just 
and democratic rule of law must prevail in order that 
we may live together in peace and as a civilized soci- 
ety. In the final sense, we ourselves create the rule of 
law through our legislative representatives, our courts, 
and our daily conduct. . . . 
This comment on Law Day is reprinted from the 1981 Planning 
Guide and Program Manual of the American Bar Association. 
THE ROLE OF CONCILIATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 
Professor Louis B. Sohn 
Most American lawyers are trained to win cases for 
their clients in adversary proceedings before courts, 
administrative agencies, or arbitration panels. Only in 
recent years has a new emphasis been put on settling 
a dispute a t  an early stage by more amicable means, 
especially through negotiation or mediation. 
In other countries, in particular in many develop- 
ing countries, there is great interest in another meth- 
od of dealing with disputes, i.e. conciliation, a process 
relying on a third party but less rigid than court or ar- 
bitration proceedings. Similarly in international rela- 
tions, there have been from time to time attempts to 
promote conciliation as the most feasible means for 
settling international disputes. For instance, the United 
States concluded between 1928 and 1940 twenty- 
seven conciliation agreements, mainly with European 
countries, but also with Egypt and Ethiopia. The 
United States is  also a party, together with seventeen 
Latin American countries, to the General Convention 
of I nter-American Conciliation of 1929. 
More recently, there has been a revival of the idea 
of conciliation in two quite separate areas. During the 
current negotiations on the law of the sea, an agree- 
ment was reached to submit some 90% of the disputes 
which might arise under the new convention to an in- 
ternational court or an international arbitral tribunal. 
But when difficulties arose with respect to certain dis- 
putes (those relating to fishing or scientific research 
in a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and to bound- 
aries of that zone and the continental shelf between 
States with adjacent or opposite coasts), the so-called 
"compulsory conciliation" was accepted in 1980 as a 
compromise solution. Such conciliation can be invoked 
unilaterally by any party to the dispute, and the oth- 
er party is obliged to submit to that procedure; but, 
as in other conciliation proceedings, the report of the 
conciliation commission is  recommendatory only and 
does not bind the parties. 
"Conciliation is less formal, less 
time-consuming and less costly than 
judicial or arbitral proceedings." 
Also in 1980, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations unanimously approved a set of Conciliation 
Rules prepared by the United Nations Commission on 
lnternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a body which 
has been quite successful in reaching consensus on 
practical trade issues between capitalist and "socialist" 
States as well as between developed and developing 
countries. It was pointed out in the General Assem- 
bly's discussion that many countries have found con- 
ciliation an effective method in a variety of interna- 
tional commercial disputes. By this procedure, the 
parties can reach an amicable settlement with the as- 
sistance of a third party; it is non-judicial, does not 
involve adversary proceedings, and allows the concil i- 
ator to assist the parties in an independent impartial 
manner. Conciliation is less formal, less time-consum- 
ing and less costly than judicial or arbitral proceed- 
ings. The new rules emphasize the parties' freedom of 
action a t  all stages of the proceedings, and also give 
the conciliator reasonably wide discretion in adapting 
the process to the particular circumstances. He is like- 
ly to be guided by "principles of objectivity, fairness 
and justice", giving consideration also to the usages of 
the trade concerned. Like the UNCITRAL Arbitra- 
tion Rules which were adopted in 1976 and have al- 
ready achieved wide acceptance, the final text of the 
Conciliation Rules represents compromise solutions 
and has proved equally acceptable to countries with 
different legal, social and economic systems. 
It may also be noted that the lnternational Center 
for Settlement of l nvestment Disputes, which i s  asso- 
ciated with the lnternational Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development, has facilities not only for arbi- 
tration but also for conciliation. 
Consequently, lawyers whose clients are interested 
conrinued on page 4 
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in international trade, investment or the exploitation 
of the resources of the sea, should keep in mind that 
in many parts of the world conciliation is the preferred 
method of settling disputes, and that there are now 
agreed rules on the subject. Another device has thus 
been added to the lawyer's arsenal. 
Louis B. Sohn is Bemis Professor of lnternational Law of Har- 
vard Law School. 
THE COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO 
ClVl L LITIGATION 
Donald T. MacNaughton, Esq. 
In this era of burgeoning civil litigation the legal 
profession is under constant criticism for what appears 
to many to be a deterioration in the ability of our le- 
gal system quickly and efficiently to resolve disputes 
among the members of our society. Practicing lawyers 
often are confronted by neighbors and friends who 
are unhappy about what they perceive to be the cur- 
rent course of our system and who refer to protracted 
court proceedings, which have generated mounds of 
paper, the high cost of legal services and the plethora 
of what they deem to be frivolous lawsuits. I have 
heard criticisms of the contingent fee, as an alleged 
inducement to wasteful and unjustifiable court pro- 
ceedings, and also recently have read an attack upon 
the practice of hourly time charges for the very same 
reasons. 
There is  no doubt that we are experiencing what 
Mr. Justice Powell called in an address entitled "Re- 
forms-Long Overdue", given to The Association of 
The Bar of the City of New York in October, 1978, 
an "epidemic of litigation" which has contributed to 
an "overload crisis" in our courts. He cited other con- 
tributing causes in the rules of civil procedure and the 
liberality and multiplicity of review. 
"It is not surprising that public dissatisfaction is high, 
and criticism of lawyers and the courts is now a popular 
pastime. Although this assessment of blame is often un- 
fair, it is clear that the public rightly expects lawyers and 
judges to take the lead in achieving reform." 
The reform effort has been substantial overthe past 
few years. The profession certainly has not failed to 
respond to the call. Thousands of hours of attorney's 
time have been devoted, individually and in various 
bar association activities, to efforts to identify the 
problems and to develop methods of improving the 
judicial system. This job has gone on largely unnoticed 
by those outside the profession who are so quick to 
criticize it. Some of the fruits of the reform effort in- 
clude the recent 1980 amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, including the addition of 
Rule 26(f), providing for a discovery conference. 
Other proposals, including a change in Rule 26(b)(l) 
with respect to the scope of discovery and a change in 
Rule 33(a) to limit the number of questions that can 
be asked by interrogatories to parties, were consid- 
ered a t  length although not ultimately adopted by the 
Committee on Rules of Practice of Procedure. As to 
these proposals the Committee concluded that discov- 
ery abuses can best be prevented by negotiation by 
counsel and by resort to court intervention i f  counsel 
are not successful in effecting a reasonable discovery 
program. 
As a practicing trial lawyer, I have become a firm 
believer in a common sense approach to civil litiga- 
tion. That extra bit of discovery, that extra pre-trial 
motion or trip to interview yet another potential wit- 
ness should not be undertaken without a careful eval- 
uation of i t s  necessity, i t s  potential cost, i t s  potential 
for success and the overall benefit such a step offers 
to the case, particularly in the context of the sums a t  
stake. More often than not, the fact that the rules 
may authorize such a step does not mean that counsel 
is obligated to undertake it. This type of evaluation 
often is difficult to perform, for it seems intrinsically 
to conflict both with the advocate's natural inclina- 
tion to be as aggressive as possible in our adversarial 
system of justice and with the attorney's training and 
discipline to be careful, precise and thorough. Yet, an 
unnecessary and unsuccessful motion, undertaken a t  
substantial cost to the client by an overzealous advo- 
cate, is a disservice to the client, to the court and to 
the public. 
Donald T. MacNaughton is a partner of White & Case in New 
York City. 
ARBITRATION-AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO LITIGATION 
Robert Coulson, Esq. 
At many law schools, arbitration does not exist as 
a subject. For that matter, negotiating skills are sel- 
dom included in the formal curriculum. At the most, 
a lecture or two on labor law will describe the union 
grievance arbitration process. International arbitra- 
tion may be mentioned in a casual way. 
continued on page 5 
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Only after graduation do law students learn that 
the primary function of most lawyers is to negotiate 
contracts and hammer out settlements. To their sur- 
prise, they discover arbitration clauses in contract af- 
ter contract. They wonder why no one ever told them 
about the Uniform Arbitration Law, the various rules 
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and 
the intriguing notion that their clients would prefer 
not to resolve business controversies in court. Clients 
rarely appreciate an attorney who leads them into lit- 
igation. Most Americans do not believe that a court- 
house provides a realistic, practical method for resolv- 
ing business disputes. Court procedures are seen as 
anachronistic. 
"Businessmen prefer to present their con- 
troversies to an impartial expert . . . They 
appreciate the informality, the privacy and 
the convenience of arbitration." 
Arbitration has become an attractive alternative to 
litigation. Businessmen prefer to present their contro- 
versies to an impartial expert, someone who under- 
stands their trade. They appreciate the informality, 
the privacy and the convenience of arbitration. In 
general, they prefer a system that results in a final 
and binding decision. The AAA, a private nonprofit 
agency, administers over 40,000 arbitration cases each 
year. More than 60,000 arbitrators serve on the AAA's 
panels, including lawyers, engineers, executives and 
other experts. There are many other arbitration sys- 
tems in operation involving insurance, securities, mar- 
itime claims and other specialized areas. Lawyers are 
involved in a l l  of them. 
Of course, businessmen would rather avoid arbitra- 
tion. In most cases, being practical people, they would 
prefer to settle disputes without resort to a third par- 
ty. Arbitration clauses aid such settlement by encour- 
aging the parties to make concessions among them- 
selves in order to avoid third party intervention. Any 
issue that can be arbitrated can be settled but i f  the 
parties cannot settle, their disputes can always be 
arbitrated. 
Law students should acquire basic negotiating skills 
during their legal education. Nothing learned a t  law 
school will be more helpful after graduation. The abil- 
ity to bargain for clients, use arbitration clauses in 
contracts and present cases in the various arbitration 
forums will strengthen an attorney's ability to resolve 
problems. 
The American Arbitration Association can assist 
lawyers and law students wishing to learn more about 
The Fine Print 5 
negotiation. Local AAA offices provide literature, in- 
formation and an opportunity to audit arbitration 
hearings. Seminars are also available. Lawyers and law 
students are welcome to take advantage of these re- 
sources. Such exposure will reveal a major segment of 
the American legal process that has been obscured by 
the court-oriented law school curriculum. 
Robert Coulson, a member of the Bar of the City of New York, 
is President of the American Arbitration Association. 
EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 
Professor Frank Kennedy 
Senate hearings conducted early in April 1981 fo- 
cused in considerable part on provisions for exemp- 
tions under the bankruptcy laws. Changes in those 
provisions made by and following in the wake of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 suggest the appro- 
priateness of some comments on their effects and 
implications. 
Bankruptcy in the United States has departed 
profoundly from the institution as it appeared in i t s  
earliest forms in continental Europe and England 
and as it has subsequently developed in those coun- 
tries. The major difference is  the recognition in the 
American law that providing a fresh start for a debt- 
laden individual is  a principal and proper goal of 
bankruptcy. Congress pursued that goal by extend- 
ing, in successive bankruptcy acts and amendments, 
the benefits available to bankrupts, particularly in 
provisions allowing debtors to keep property ex- 
empt from their creditors' claims and discharging 
their debts. It has frequently been contended by 
opponents of this kind of legislation that it will hurt 
rather than help the intended beneficiaries because it 
will lead to a restriction on the availability of con- 
sumer credit. Comparison of the figures showing the 
volume of consumer credit in this and other countries 
quickly dispels the notion that our debtor-oriented 
bankruptcy laws have had a constrictive effect on the 
availability of credit. 
Congress is granted the power to establish "uni- 
form laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through- 
out the United States" by Article 1, section 8, of 
the Constitution. The mandate of uniformity has 
not been deemed to require Congress to enact a 
comprehensive code of substantive law of property 
and creditors' rights and debtors' obligations for ap- 
plication in bankruptcy cases. Rather the bankruptcy 
continued on page 6 
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laws, like the federal tax laws, have been superim- 
posed on the body of substantive law of the several 
states. Thus, when Congress enacted the Bankrupt- 
cy Act of 1898, it allowed every bankrupt to have 
the benefit of the laws of the state of his or her 
domicile exempting property from claims of credi- 
tors. This provision was promptly challenged as un- 
constitutional because of the resulting nonunifor- 
mity of the exemptions available to bankrupts domi- 
ciled in different states. The Supreme Court rejected 
the challenge by finding "geographic uniformity." 
". . . the federal and state legislation that 
allows domiciliaries of some states to have 
the benefit of federal exemptions and 
denies the option to domiciliaries of oth- 
er states is both unwise and unconstitu- 
tional." 
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States nevertheless recommended in 1973 
that the exemptions allowable to a bankrupt be pre- 
scribed by a uniform national standard. As the 
Commission explained, "This approach avoids the 
unfairness of existing state exemptions laws, most 
of which are exceedingly niggardly, particularly as 
to urban residents." The Commission's proposal 
met strong resistance, however, particularly from 
states that had more generous exemption laws than 
those proposed by the Commission. As an eloquent 
Dallas lawyer said, "Texas came into the union with 
i t s  homestead and it will go out with i t s  homestead i f  
federal legislation attempts to take it away." H.R. 
8200, passed by the House on February 1,1978, would 
have allowed a bankrupt individual to choose between 
a federal package of exemptions and those provided 
by the laws of his or her state of domicile. S. 2266, 
which passed the Senate on September 6, 1978, how- 
ever, would have restricted exemptions to those allow- 
able under the law of the bankrupt's state of domicile. 
This discrepancy was one among several hundred dif- 
ferences between the two comprehensive bankruptcy 
bills passed by the two houses of Congress that had to 
be reconciled in the closing days of the 95th Con- 
gress. The compromise that emerged was one that 
allows an individual debtor to choose between fed- 
eral and state exemptions as provided in the House 
Bill, unless the debtor's state, by subsequent1 y en- 
acted legislation, withdraws the right to opt for fed- 
eral exemptions. I t  is  regrettable that 18 state legis- 
latures (according to the latest report to reach me) 
have acted to deprive their constituents of the op- 
tion that Congress has extended to debtors living in 
other states. 
In my opinion the federal and state legislation 
that allows domiciliaries of some states to have the 
benefit of federal exemptions and denies the option 
to domiciliaries of other states is  both unwise and 
unconstitutional. It will hardly be contended that 
Congress could enact as a part of a national bank- 
ruptcy act a provision allowing any state legislature 
to deprive i t s  domiciliaries of the right to seek re- 
lief generally available under the act to persons sub- 
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States. I t  would 
be no less offensive as a matter of constitutional 
principle for Congress to authorize a state to deprive 
i t s  domiciliaries of the right to obtain a discharge or 
to claim exemptions generally available to debtors 
domiciled in other states. Challenges to legislation on 
the ground that it constitutes an unconstitutional 
delegation are not favored, but there are limitations 
on the extent to which Congress can delegate i t s  
power respecting bankruptcy to state legislatures. It 
can no doubt, as it did during most of the Nineteenth 
Century, leave bankruptcy entirely to  the states, 
subject to-the constitutional limitations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress also can, as it did 
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, enact bankruptcy 
legislation that leaves most state substantive law 
undisturbed notwithstanding i t s  diversity. It flouts 
the constitutional mandate of uniformity, however, 
for Congress to include in a bankruptcy law a proviso 
authorizing a state legislature to withdraw benefits of 
the federal law solely on the basis of the location of 
the debtor's domicile. 
Both federal and state laws are subject to consti- 
tutional challenge when they deny equal protec- 
tion. The federal and state legislation that allows 
the availability of the federal exemptions to depend 
on the location of the debtor's domicile seems vul- 
nerable to a charge of irrational and thus indefen- 
sible classification, but the courts have indulged an 
almost conclusive presumption of constitutionality 
on classifications that are not predicted on race. In 
like manner, state legislation that deprives domicili- 
aries of particular states of the right to choose fed- 
eral exemptions seems to be a plain abridgment of 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States in derogation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but that guaranty has been given ex- 
ceedingly narrow scope by the Supreme Court. 
Congress may respond to some of the current cri- 
ticism of the exemption provisions of the Bankrupt- 
cy Reform Act by placing some limitations on the 
exemptions allowable in bankruptcy, irrespective 
continued on page 7 
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of whether the debtor claims state or federal ex- 
emptions. It is my hope, however, that Congress 
will terminate what I believe to be an ill advised 
and unconstitutional delegation to state legislatures 
of the power to determine whether federal rights 
to relief under the Bankruptcy Act should be avail- 
able to their domiciliaries. 
Frank R. Kennedy is Thomas M. Cooley Professor of the 
University of Michigan Law School. 
LEGAL OBSTACLES TO TRADE BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Heinrich von Moltke 
One of the major achievements of the Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations concluded in 1979 was the adop- 
tion by most industrialized countries (and certain de- 
veloping ones) of a number of revisions to the Gener- 
al  Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These re- 
visions covered, inter alia, uniform rules in respect of 
the application of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties. The United States and the European Commu- 
nities (E.C.), which are the world's major traders, sub- 
sequently adopted rather similar domestic legislation 
implementing these new rules. 
However, while the transcription of the GATT rules 
into domestic legislation is  similar on both sides of 
the Atlantic, the differences in legal systems and ad- 
ministrative traditions may lead to rather different 
consequences for trade. In the E.C. these rules are ad- 
ministered entirely by the Commission of the Euro- 
pean Communities, whose decisions may be challenged 
before the Court of Justice of the European Commu- 
nities. In the United States, the Commerce Depart- 
ment is  responsible for the administration, but the In- 
ternational Trade Commission has a decisive role to 
play in that it determines whether imports cause "ma- 
terial injury". In the absence of such a determination, 
a case cannot be pursued. Commerce Department de- 
cisions can, of course, be challenged in court. 
The main difference between the two systems, and 
the one which creates most concern for European ex- 
porters, is  the great detail and inflexibility of U.S. regu- 
lations in the field of dumping and subsidy investiga- 
tions. Once an investigation has been started, it is vir- 
tually impossible for the U.S. administration to stop 
the procedure, unless the International Trade Com- 
mission finds that there is  no material injury caused 
by imports, or unless the petitioner withdraws his 
complaint. Procedures can be extremely long and cost- 
ly. One example is the antidumping procedureopened 
in 1980 by the U.S. Steel Corporation against imports 
of steel from seven E.C. Member States. Not only did 
legal fees for the defendants run into very important 
figures, but, more importantly, the very opening of 
the investigation had a chilling effect on trade. Steel 
is  a commodity where delivery (for a trans-atlantic 
producer) would normally occur about three months 
after the conclusion of a contract. Since the Com- 
merce Department was due to make i t s  preliminary 
determination of the existence of dumping in Octo- 
ber 1980, following which antidumping duties could 
be imposed, new orders started dwindling in June, 
with consequent substantial losses for E.C. producers. 
". . . while the transcription of the GAlT rules 
into domestic legislation is similar on both 
sides of the Atlantic, the differences in legal 
systems and administrative traditions may 
lead to rather different consequences for 
trade." 
While the particular characteristics of the steel in- 
dustry (i.e., the long lead time referred to above) ex- 
ascerbated the effects of the antidumping investiga- 
tion, similar "chilling" effects can be expected for other 
branches of industry. In these branches, as in the steel 
industry, the uncertainty engendered by the opening 
of an investigation will be compounded by the diffi- 
culty in calculating dumping margins. Ultimately, 
there will be a chilling effect on trans-atlantic trade. 
Heinrich von Moltke is Deputy Head of the Delegation of the 
Commission of the European Communities to the United States 
in Washington, D. C. 
PROSPER0 AS CLIENT: WHAT DO LAWYERS 
OWE TO BUSINESSMEN? 
Professor William F. Young 
Some years ago when the world price of wheat 
moved up sharply, a newspaper reader learned that 
the United States government proposed to honor a 
commitment to deliver a large quantity of wheat to 
the U.S.S.R.-at far below the current market price. 
continued on page 8 
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The reader wrote a letter to the editor complaining of 
the terms of the contract. His complaint was directed 
to the competence of the lawyers for the United 
States who had negotiated the terms of sale. He said, 
in substance, that every competent lawyer writes 
contracts with loopholes the size of barn doors, such 
that a party can edge out when circumstances make 
his commitment an uncomfortable one. Why, the 
writer asked querulously, weren't the lawyers on our 
side good enough to do that? Remembering that 
letter has made me smile, from time to time, but it 
has also prompted me to think what commercial in- 
terests-businessmen-are entitled to expect from law- 
yers. Not only regarding the fiduciary duties owed an 
individual client by a lawyer but also what the busi- 
ness world is entitled to from the institutions and dis- 
positions of the law. What kinds of support can busi- 
ness firms fairly claim from lawyers acting corporate- 
ly, whether as practitioners, as judges, or as legislators? 
"A lawyer must not undertake serv- 
ice that implies either magical means 
for business ends or servile accep- 
tance of business values." 
My answer is, in general, "very little." Lawyers on- 
ly owe to businessmen a full and attentive hearing, 
profound sympathy with their grievances and objec- 
tives, a thorough grasp of means in relation to ends, 
diligence, clarity in expression, the candor of a good 
penitent, the skill and patience of a great teacher, and 
a few other related items. Asking for all that, one 
might say, is a ta l l  order, particularly when a person 
of any humility considers his own ability to deliver. 
But nowhere in the l is t  is there anything aboutresults. 
I propose that we in the law do not owe a given effect, 
or set of effects, to all and sundry business arrange- 
ments. 
There are those-such as the letter writer-who say 
otherwise. Some say we owe businessmen the widest 
possible field in which to pursue self-interest. Some 
say we owe them clear and certain statements about 
the legal consequences of their acts. Some say we owe 
them exemption from struggles of conscience about 
the damage they may inflict on their fellows in busi- 
ness, and perhaps even about injury to the general wel- 
fare. And some make much more complicated de- 
mands. An economist asks the courts to steer for that 
single set of laws tending most to make our society 
wealthy. A philosopher calls for an exact line between 
deals that are allowed and deals that are not, based on 
a legal accounting (as it were) of costs and benefits to 
dealers and nondealers alike. In my judgment, lawyers 
and the law had better not promise any of these things 
and ought to withhold absolute allegiance to any or- 
dering of commercial affairs. 
Surely the compact between law and business re- 
quires, on our side, only a tentative and flexible com- 
mitment to what businessmen do and ask. It i s  all too 
easy for the law to be conscripted by the supposed re- 
quirements of commerce: courts have been known to  
treat usage of trade as a Higher Law that overrides a 
plain-spoken contract. It is  tempting for lawyers to 
wink at overreaching in business. It is tempting also 
for law and lawyers to infuse a spirit of confrontation 
into business dealings, turning every negotiation and 
grievance into a shoot-out. ~usinessmen deserve bet- 
ter than that. At  times we must reinforce their scru- 
ples at the expense of their greed, even when we do 
not know what the ultimate social end may be. Some- 
times, as Saint Paul said, one must "speak, and exhort, 
and rebuke with all authority;" and so the law must 
deal with business mores. At  times we must enlist on 
the side of greed, counting a competitive gain as part 
of the general gain. To quote again (out of context) 
from Saint Paul: "every man hath his proper gift." At  
times we must insist on humanitarianism in the pur- 
suit of profit, knowing that one who takes spoils from 
another demeans both himself and the other. "Let 
your moderation be known unto all men," said the 
same author. 
It is for lawyers and businessmen together, and to- 
gether with those who are neither-citizens all-to say 
what sorts of assistance business purposes may fairly 
claim from law and lawyers. Lawyers are indispensa- 
ble counsellors in this regard. But the grounds for jus- 
t ify ing both business purposes and legal supports for 
them l ie outside the law. I f  a businessman brings his 
expectations to his lawyer for armor plating, he is ask- 
ing too much; and i f  he wants to live in a world of le- 
gal loopholes, he is  also expecting too much. A law- 
yer must not undertake service that implies either 
magical means for business ends or servile acceptance 
of business values. To the client, Prospero, he must be 
faithful withal, but he must not serve him either as 
Ariel or as Caliban. 
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